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Prospects for Peace in the Middle East
JOSEPH SZYIOWICZ*
For the first time in many years hope exists that imaginative
diplomacy can bring to an end the vicious cycle of war and more war
that has afflicted Israelis and Arabs for so many tragic years. Yet, as
I shall demonstrate below, that hope still remains only a hope; even
though an important door to peace was opened with the conclusion
of the recent Israeli-Egyptian agreement, the very considerable diffi-
culties that had to be surmounted and the extensive promises that
the United States had to make demonstrate only too clearly how
difficult it will be to reach agreement on the tougher issues that lie
ahead.
One important reason why peace is likely to be elusive is that
although many Arabs might now be willing to seek a peaceful settle-
ment of this tragic conflict, many others still regard Israel as an alien
intrusion whose sovereign Jewish character must be eliminated. And
such Arabs are not only in power in such states as Libya or in control
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, but they represent impor-
tant elements within other countries including Egypt, which is gener-
ally regarded as one of the leading "moderates" in the region. Thus
the road to peace is complicated by very different perceptions within
the Arab world concerning the character, goals, and legitimacy of
Israel, and this disunity extends to important groups within each
state and to the ranks of the Palestinians as well. In short, even if one
is optimistic concerning the intention and willingness of Arab leaders
such as President Sadat to strive for a final settlement, pressures
within and between the Arab states do not facilitate its achievement.
Further complicating the search for peace is a similar division
within Israel. Here conflict revolves around different perceptions of
the goals and intentions of the Arab states and important differences
concerning the willingness to take risks to achieve peace are evident.
Many view President Sadat as a leader who remains committed to
the destruction of Israel but who is engaged in clever tactical maneu-
vering designed to enhance his position and, though once the govern-
ment accepted the deal with Egypt arranged by Kissinger only a
minority remained in opposition, more and more Israelis may be less
and less willing to make the kinds of concessions that may be required
to resolve the more difficult questions such as Jerusalem, the Golan
Heights and the future of the Palestinians, that must inevitably be-
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come the foci of negotiations. The existence of such perceptions by
the parties involved has for years complicated the search for peace
in the Middle East and continues to do so at present.
However one views the extent to which Sadat and other Arab
leaders may be genuinely interested in peace, there is widespread
agreement that the October 1973 war represents a watershed in the
bloody history of the region. The war forced a reappraisal of Israeli
strategic doctrine, demonstrated that the new military technology
would make another major conflict far more destructive than hereto-
fore, and gave the Arabs a sense of accomplishment that may repre-
sent a necessary psychological precondition for peace. Above all, it
forced the United States to accord a high priority to the region and
Secretary of State Kissinger, spurred by concern for U.S. interests
(including the flow of oil), moved astutely to exploit the new situa-
tion. He initiated an active round of diplomacy that culminated in
an end to the embargo and in military disengagement agreements
between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai and Israel and Syria in the
Golan Heights. In September 1975 he achieved, after seven days of
intensive "shuttle diplomacy," what he failed to accomplish six
months earlier-a second interim agreement between Egypt and Is-
rael. This accord, which is qualitatively different from the original
disengagement agreements, represented an important development
in the search for peace. This agreement extends the military truce
that had prevailed into new areas, both geographically, as the Israelis
made significant strategic concessions by withdrawing from the key
Sinai passes and the important Abu Rudeis oil field and functionally,
for the new accord is designed to prevent hostilities for at least three
years and to lessen tensions in order to permit the development of the
kind of climate that might lead to further agreements. Specifically
the two parties agreed that the conflict should be resolved by peaceful
rather than military means, that neither would use force or military
blockades and that Egypt would permit civil cargoes to or from Israel
to pass through the Suez Canal and would not blockade the Red Sea.
The United States also entered into separate agreements with the two
parties which were instrumental in making the accord possible.
Among other things the United States pledged to assist Israel with
extensive economic and military assistance, amounting to over $2
billion. Moreover, American civilian technicians are to man surveil-
lance stations that would monitor the military aspects of the accord
and thus act as a deterrent should either side attempt to alter the
military status quo.
The difficulties in reaching agreement on essentially the simplest
of the issues that must be resolved in the search for peace were im-
mense. The Israelis felt that they were taking a significant gamble in
ceding strategic territory for Egyptian promises, and Kissinger had
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to press the Israeli government hard to get them to accept his opti-
mistic view that an unique opportunity to achieve a settlement now
existed, and Israel should therefore take a long term perspective and
be willing to take some chances in order to make peace possible. That
Israeli leaders remained unconvinced of Arab intentions and were not
easily persuaded (despite their awareness of the costs of alienating
the United States, Israel's indispensable ally) is attested to by the
breakdown of the March 1975 negotiations and the kinds of commit-
ments that they extracted from the United States in return for their
concessions.
President Sadat also had to weigh difficult and complex consid-
erations. Beset by serious internal problems including a weak econ-
omy, a rapidly growing population and marked social tensions, he
desired the agreement so that he could concentrate on these issues
and secure the American economic and technological assistance that
is indispensable if Egypt is to escape from its socio-economic stagna-
tion. This policy, however, was not universally applauded within the
Arab world. On the one hand, such moderate-conservative, oil-rich
states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait strongly supported Sadat's at-
tempt to reorient his country more towards the West and, one should
add, so did Iran, a non-Arab state which is playing a subtle and
important background role in the politics of the area. On the other
hand, radical elements within Egypt and the Arab world viewed
Sadat's policy as a betrayal of the Arab struggle. In addition, the
press and radio of Libya, Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Syria, bitterly
criticized the Egyptian decision.
One reason for the discord, besides the apparent rift that it cre-
ates within the Arab world, is that Sadat's decision forces other Arab
parties to choose among very difficult options. Particularly affected
were the Palestinians and Syria for the latter is clearly the next state
to be involved in negotiations. It will be far more difficult, however,
for the Syrians and Israelis to reach agreement because of the stra-
tegic importance of the Golan Heights to the two sides and the lim-
ited area involved. In sharp contrast to the pre-1967 situation when
Syrian artillery harassed Israeli communities, it is the Israelis who
now possess the potential to shell Damascus itself and to drive back
any Syrian offensive before it enters Israel. Moreover, control of Mt.
Hermon gives the Israelis a very strategic observation post. These are
advantages that the Israelis are not likely to concede lightly, particu-
lary since they tend to consider President Assad to be even more
intransigent than Sadat. Further complicating the issue is the fact
that the Israelis have established about twenty settlements in the
area which, as government spokesmen have made clear on several
occasions, will not be evacuated until a final settlement is reached.
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Assad, too, is beset by conflicting pressures from within Syria
and from the other Arab states. Though he has successfully enlarged
the base of his support and maintained a stable regime since he came
to power in 1970, Assad must maneuver carefully so as not to alienate
important elements within Syria. Moreover, the Syrian Bath Party
which he heads is engaged in a bitter ideological dispute with its
counterpart in Iraq, each claiming to be the correct interpreter and
exponent of Bathist ideology, and has consistently taken a tough line
over any agreement with Israel. In its national congress of July 1975,
for example, resolutions calling for the "liberation" of all Palestine
were passed.
Given such an officially rigid stance, Assad did not welcome the
Israeli-Egyptian agreement. Not wishing to be isolated he utilized
various tactics to strengthen his position' and to pressure Egypt, in-
cluding reaching agreement with two actors, the PLO and King Hus-
sein, who were bitter enemies. He established a "joint command"
with the guerrillas and set up a "Supreme Command Council" with
Jordan thus creating a framework within which to coordinate eco-
nomic and military affairs. These dramatic developments represent
a potential threat to Tel Aviv, for Syrian-Jordanian military coopera-
tion (possibly supported by the Iraqis who, despite their feud with
Syria, remain publicly strongly committed to the extreme Arab posi-
tion concerning Israel) changes the strategic situation and strength-
ens Assad's hands in future negotiations. Assad also played an active
role in the campaign to expel Israel from the United Nations, a move
which further increased his bargaining position but which also
brought him into conflict with President Sadat who, apparently in
accordance with the terms of the interim agreement, successfully
blunted this policy on several occasions.
Under these conditions it is not easy to foresee what will follow
the Egyptian-Israeli accord on the northern front. It is unlikely that
a comprehensive agreement could be worked out in the near future
given the ideological differences, and the strategic importance of the
Golan Heights. Assad could therefore choose to renew military hostil-
ities in some way or accept. minor changes along the existing cease
fire lines. The military option is not likely to appear attractive, how-
ever, given the present state of relations with Iraq and King Hussein's
unwillingness to take significant risks. Hence it is quite possible that
Assad will accept (as Kissinger has been urging) some kind of rectifi-
cations with the understanding that serious talks over the future of
the entire Golan Heights will be undertaken within a reasonable
time.
Such a development would be highly favorable, for an an agree-
ment would maintain the initiative towards peace and might lead to
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a relaxation of tensions and the development of a more propitious
climate for a broader understanding on the future of the Golan. When
such an accord could be negotiated is not clear, for tensions will
probably have to be reduced before the Israelis would be willing to
make major concessions and time is clearly required for feelings of
trust to develop. In this regard, too, the agreement with Egypt is
pivotal-if stability and a relaxation of hostilities does occur then
progress in talks between Syria and Israel will be facilitated. Such
developments will not occur quickly, however. Merely to implement
the military aspects of the Sinai accord will take about six months
and further time will have to elapse before the deeply ingrained per-
ceptions of each side can be modified. Moreover, the U.S. presiden-
tial elections are rapidly approaching and it is not likely that the
United States would be prepared to engage in a new initiative
involving major commitments before January, 1977.
Even if one takes a very optimistic view concerning the possibil-
ity of an agreement between Syria and Israel, one is still left with the
sensitive question of the future of Jerusalem and the critical issue
which is central to any long range solution-the future of the Pales-
tinians. They too (within and without the PLO) are badly divided.
One must remember that many live on the West Bank (which King
Hussein has not abandoned despite the resolutions of the Rabat con-
ference) and the Gaza strip. In these areas many diverse currents can
be discerned ranging from support for King Hussein to pro-PLO feel-
ings. Even if one considers the PLO to be representative of the Pales-
tinians, however, the pattern is still one of division and discord. Es-
sentially, the PLO is split between the "moderates" headed by Yasir
Arafat and the "rejectionists" who oppose any concessions to Israel
and who refuse to compromise in any way their goal of establishing
that "democratic secular state" which so obviously represents a eu-
phemism for the destruction of Israel.
Egypt's decision was a bitter blow to the PLO's leadership for it
threatens the very bases of its claims and suggests that Egypt may
be willing to make peace at the expense of the Palestinians. Equally
troublesome is the dilemma that Sadat's action poses for them. If
Arafat breaks with Egypt he risks alienating that important country
as well as those elements in the Arab world, particularly the oil rich
states of the Persian Gulf, who support President Sadat and his poli-
cies. If he does not break with Egypt he runs the great risk that his
position and that of the moderates will be undermined by the "rejec-
tionists."
What kind of response will be forthcoming as well as what kind
of agreement can be worked out that involves the Palestinians is
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therefore very difficult to foresee, though at the time that Yasir Ara-
fat appeared before the United Nations General Assembly there were
some tentative signs that moderates within the PLO might be willing
to compromise their hitherto unyielding stand concerning Israel.
Whether these did in fact signal the evolution of a new negotiating
stance is unclear but the task of diplomacy is to explore such possibil-
ities. Here, too, the positions taken by the other Arab states are
critical and at present it appears that only Libya is uncompromi-
singly set against any agreements with Israel. Even such hitherto
obdurate countries as Iraq, which may be turning more and more to
questions of domestic development, and Syria, which runs a consider-
able risk of diplomatic isolation, may well choose to coordinate their
policies more closely with Egypt and those other states that appear
willing to reconcile their differences with Israel. If such a trend does
exist within the Arab world, then the chances of an agreement involv-
ing the Palestinians are enormously enhanced, for the future of their
cause depends to a large extent on the support of key Arab states.
What emerges from this analysis, therefore, is that powerful ele-
ments within the Arab world may be moving cautiously in the direc-
tion of a settlement with Israel on terms that may be mutually ac-
ceptable. Until now the "radicals" have always possessed the prepon-
derance of political power and have been able to exert sufficient
pressure on their more moderate brethren to block agreement, but
developments in recent months do point in the direction of change
in the Arab world. It would be naive, however, to overestimate the
extent to which the kind of environment which is needed to let peace
flourish has yet occurred. Even the most moderate elements among
the Arabs and within Israel remain highly suspicious of each other's
motives and intentions and it will not be easy to secure agreement,
as I have stressed, on such difficult issues as the Golan Heights,
Jerusalem, and the future of the Palestinians.
Nevertheless, the effort must be made and the momentum that
has been achieved must be utilized to explore and exploit whatever
potential for peace may now exist. Without this the gains to date will
be dissipated quickly. If future gains are to be made, they will come
about only after long, arduous negotiations between the parties.
That, however, may well be highly desirable for any settlement can
endure only if all those involved feel that they have struggled to
hammer out an agreement which provides them with the greatest
possible benefits and which represents accomodations that each can
accept positively. Only at the end of such a process, a process which
must include a general meeting of some sort at Geneva, can one
envisage the Middle East as a region of peace whose inhabitants will
be free to achieve the kind of future to which they all aspire.
VOL. 5:387
